¡TOCHO VA!
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.u ... mary_2.pdfEn este documento se hace un prefacio que bajo mi punto de vista es bastante deficiente como análisis de mercado, lo cual es irrelevante porque esto no va de lo que yo u otros creamos sino de cómo ver la CMA el mercado.
Seguidamente se hace un assessment de la situación, concluyendo que hay más de un 50% de posibilidades de que el acuerdo suponga que la competencia (ojo, la competencia, no los consumidores) pueda verse afectada negativamente.
Han recibido, ojo al dato,
más de 3 MILLONES de documentos de Microsoft y ABK para hacer el análisis.
Existen errores de fechas en el documento, concretamente en el punto 31:
31. The Parties also had several opportunities to make submissions and comment
on our emerging thinking throughout the investigation. In October 2021, the
Parties submitted a response to our phase 1 decision.
Menuda cagada por parte de la CMA.
Han encuestado únicamente a jugadores de PlayStation de Call of Duty sobre cómo les afecta el acuerdo. No a los de PC o Xbox, solo a los de PlayStation.
El párrafo 45 es directamente un chiste que se cuenta solo:
45. First, the evidence shows that CoD accounts for a significant proportion of
PlayStation’s overall gametime, implying that making it totally or partially
exclusive to Xbox would represent an important reduction in range of games
offered on PlayStation.
La CMA cree que Microsoft podría obtener beneficios si hace COD exclusivo de Xbox:
51. Third, we provisionally believe that making CoD exclusive to Xbox could be
profitable for Microsoft. Although it is difficult to quantify Microsoft’s financial
gains and losses from making CoD partially or totally exclusive to Xbox, we
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have tried to approximate these by using two different financial models. One
model measured the direct financial gains over the course of one year of
making CoD exclusive to Xbox. It is a straightforward comparison of the
income that Microsoft would lose from not selling CoD on PlayStation against
the additional income that it would earn from selling CoD, additional Xbox
consoles, and other games to new customers who would switch—as
estimated from our survey results—from PlayStation to Xbox. We provisionally
found that this calculation on its own was broadly neutral in terms of
profitability. The other model considered data used by Xbox in the ordinary
course of business on the ‘lifetime value’ of new customers. This has the
benefit of accounting for five years of spend on the Xbox platform and on CoD.
This model, which we currently believe is a better way to estimate long-term
financial incentives, suggests that making CoD exclusive to Xbox would be
profitable for Microsoft.
La CMA cree que el acuerdo sería beneficioso para los servicios de suscripción, pero que haría que gran parte de los jugadores de PlayStation pudieran migrar a Xbox (duh?).
La CMA cree que Sony y Microsoft están en la misma posición de mercado y que compiten de tú a tú, y el párrafo 73 es demoledor para Microsoft:
73. Second, the weakening of PlayStation, both in terms of its range and revenue,
could eventually harm all console gamers. Consumers currently benefit from
the fact that Xbox and PlayStation compete closely with each other. Although
we recognise that PlayStation is currently the market leader in consoles,
PlayStation’s strong competitive offering makes it necessary for Xbox to
compete hard to attract users, including on price and through the quality of its
console, games, and multi-game subscription offering. Weakening PlayStation
by taking important content away from its platform would reduce, not increase,
Microsoft’s incentive and Sony’s ability to compete in the console market. This
could eventually lead to higher prices, reduced range, lower quality, worse
service and/or reduced innovation in gaming consoles and their games for all
gamers.
Sobre las remediaciones:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.u ... medies.pdfLA CMA podría aceptar una mezcla de remediaciones estructurales y de comportamiento:
13. The CMA will also consider whether a combination of measures is required to
achieve a comprehensive solution – for example whether any behavioural
remedies would be required in a supporting role to safeguard the
effectiveness of any structural remedies. The CMA will evaluate the impact of
any such combination of measures on the SLC or any resulting adverse
effects.
La CMA podría usar remediaciones de comportamiento si únicamente se diesen estas situaciones:
(a) divestiture and/or prohibition is not feasible, or the relevant costs of any
feasible structural remedy far exceed the scale of the adverse effects of
the SLC;
(b) the SLC is expected to have a short duration; or
(c) behavioural measures will preserve substantial relevant customer benefits
(RCBs) that would be largely removed by structural remedies.
SLC significa "substantial lessening of competition" (Disminución sustancial de la competencia).
El punto más importante al que Microsoft se tiene que agarrar si no quiere entrar en remediaciones estructurales:
18. Microsoft has, however, informed us of existing and potential contractual
arrangements with third-party platforms relating to access to Call of Duty.
Accordingly, while none of the circumstances in which the CMA would select
a behavioural remedy as the primary source of remedial action in a merger
investigation (as summarised in paragraph 15 above) appear to be present,
the CMA will also consider a behavioural access remedy as a possible
remedy
Aunque normalmente no lo hace, la CMA está dispuesta a aceptar remediaciones de comportamiento como remediaciones primarias en lugar de las estructurales.
