Wikileaks filtra documentos secretos de política exterior

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 MADRID 000071

SIPDIS

PASS TO ELAINE SAMSON AND STACIE ZERDECKI AT EUR/WE,
JANICE BELL AT INR
TOBY BRADLEY AT NSC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2034
TAGS: OVIP PINS PREL PTER OFDP SP PGOV
SUBJECT: SPAIN: DEPARTING AMBASSADOR'S INSIGHTS ON ENGAGING
GOS LEADERSHIP

REF: A. 08 MADRID 1359
¶B. 08 MADRID 518

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d)

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

¶9. XXXXXXXXXXXXX
For example, at one point the Ambassador informed Zapatero that
U.S. CEO's might decide to stop bidding in Spain due to a
growing perception that the GOS was not welcoming US bidders
on procurement contracts. Zapatero had told the Ambassador
to let him know if there was something important to the USG
and he would take care of it. Later - when the USG had
agreed to advocate on behalf of GE in a bid against Rolls
Royce for a Spanish MOD contract to provide helicopter motors
- GE informed the Ambassador that failure to win the contract
would cause that branch of GE to cease operations in Spain,
which the Ambassador duly informed Zapatero's economic
adviser. Although there was considerable all-source evidence
to suggest that the MOD decided to award the contract to
Rolls Royce, Moncloa - the office of the President -
overturned the decision and it was announced that GE had won
the bid. The Ambassador is convinced that Zapatero
personally intervened in the case in favor of GE.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX
CHACON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000982

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EEB/TPP/IPE, AND EEB/CIP
STATE PASS USTR FOR D.WEINER AND J.GROVES
COMMERCE FOR 4212/DON CALVERT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KIPR ETRD ECPS KCRM SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: INTERNET PIRACY UPDATE

REF: MADRID 417 AND PREVIOUS

MADRID 00000982 001.3 OF 002


SUMMARY

¶1. (SBU) Secretary of State for Telecommunications and the
Information Society Francisco Ros told Econoffs at an October
6 AmCham breakfast that "within a matter of days," the GOS
will announce a series of measures designed to tackle
Internet piracy. The President of the Coalition of Creators
and Content Industries reported separately that the Coalition
may reach a "de minimis" agreement with the association of
Internet Service Providers (Redtel) in the next week or two,
leading to a government initiative. In his formal remarks at
the breakfast, Ros briefly addressed IPR issues,
characterizing the assertion by copyright-dependent
industries that Spain has one of the highest Internet piracy
rates in the world as an "urban legend." USG officials and
U.S.-based industry representatives will have an opportunity
during Ros's October 19-22 visit to Washington to challenge
this view. End Summary.

¶2. (U) On October 6, State Secretary (Under Secretary
equivalent) Francisco Ros addressed an audience of about 80
at an AmCham-hosted breakfast, speaking on "The Development
of the Information Society in Boosting U.S.-Spain relations."
Following that event, he met with the AmCham's Intellectual
Property Committee, composed of representatives of the
software, film, music, and video games industries.

A DEAL IMMINENT?

¶3. (SBU) In a conversation with Econoffs before the event
began, State Secretary Ros, who is scheduled to visit
Washington November 19-22, said that the government will
announce a new initiative related to IPR protection and
Internet piracy "in a matter of days." Econoffs later spoke
to Aldo Olcese, President of the Coalition of Creators and
Content Providers, who confirmed that the government was
putting considerable pressure on Redtel, the ISP association,
to agree to what Olcese characterized as a "de minimis"
anti-piracy agreement. The Coalition is not enthusiastic
about the proposed agreement but intends to accept it as a
way to get the government more actively engaged in finding
and implementing solutions. Olcese estimated that the first
part of the agreement, establishing a government authority
that would take action against a number of high-profile
websites known to make pirated content available, could be
ready by the end of this week. The second part, on making
legal content available online, could, if accepted by Redtel,
be ready by October 16, he said.

REMARKS

¶4. (U) In his formal remarks, State Secretary Ros provided
statistics on the impressive growth in Internet penetration
in Spain and as well as the strong performance of the IT
sector in the face of the economic downturn. A major focus
of his remarks was promotion of the 3rd International Frum on
Digital Content (FICOD 2009) to be held in Madrid, November
17-19. The GOS has invited the U.S. to participate in FICOD
as the featured country ("invitado de honor") and is seeking
USG and private-sector participation.

¶5. (U) Towards the end of his speech, Ros turned briefly to
IPR issues, commenting that "there are no objective data
provided by any entity that shows that Spain has more
Internet piracy than its neighboring countries." He
characterized assertions by industry that Spain has one of
the highest Internet piracy rates in the world as an "urban
legend." He referred to Eurostat figures that he said show
that Spanish youth share files at about the same volume as
their peers in the UK, France, and Germany. Nevertheless, he
said, Spain takes IPR protection seriously and is among the
first countries to promote collaborative international
actions to combat the phenomenon. Ros argued that no country
can solve the piracy problem on its own and that a global
approach is needed. Spain hopes to develop such an approach
during its January-June 2010 Presidency of the European
Union. Meanwhile, he stressed that "putting into place
measures that don't work" only serves to create false
expectations that lead to disappointment and frustration.

METING WITH AMCHAM IP COMMITTEE

¶6. (U) In his subsequent meeting with the AmCham's
Intellectual Property committee, Ros returned to these

MADRID 00000982 002.3 OF 002


themes, averring that Spain's "bad reputation" for piracy
predates the era of illicit downloads and file-sharing, and
derives from the street piracy practice known as "top manta,"
in which infringing goods are sold at informal street
markets, and hidden under blankets when police appear.
(Note: "Top manta" is still widespread in Spain, but police
have been increasingly effective in combating it in recent
years, though there have been calls to decriminalize the
practice since it is allegedly practiced by impoverished
immigrants. End Note.) He insisted that the practices and
habits of Spanish Internet users are no different than those
of people in other, similar countries. In this context, he
insinuated that Spain's placement on the Special 301 Watch
List in 2008 and 2009 was arbitrary and unfair.

¶7. (U) Ros said any attempt to reduce online piracy should
have three components: repression, education, and the
exploitation of new models to make content legally available
online. He added that the Spanish government is seeking
ways, under existing authority, to pursue and take out of
commission some 100 websites that are responsible for perhaps
as much as 80 percent of infringing content. Defending the
Spanish government's IPR performance, he cited figures
showing the number of cases of Internet piracy pursued by
police and prosecutors over the past four years, even while
recognizing that many judges in Spain are not well equipped
to understand or dispose correctly of intellectual property
cases. Ros also mentioned public education campaigns Spain
has undertaking, while noting that content providers needed
to offer an alternative to illegal downloading and
file-sharing, using new forms of distribution to make quality
products available on the Internet at attractive prices.

¶8. (U) Ros told the rights-holders' representatives that
"very soon," Spain's Council of Ministers will receive for
its approval a proposal for regulatory reform to address
digital piracy. While not ruling out new legislation to
strengthen the government's authority, Ros lamented that
getting a law through Congress could take years and would
likely arouse bitter opposition.

¶9. (U) AmCham President Jaime Malet and various of those
present told State Secretary Ros that the important point was
not whether piracy in Spain was worse than in other
countries, but rather that it was clearly bad enough to merit
and require forceful government action. In order for content
providers to invest more in the Spanish market, there needs
to be an adequate legal and regulatory framework to support
quality content and make possible a decent return on
investment. The film and music industries have seen marked
declines in sales over the past several years, attributable
to the growth of Internet piracy. Ros claimed that Spain's
legal and regulatory framework was on a par with those of
France, Germany, and the UK.

COMMENT

¶10. (SBU) While not challenging to his face Ros's assertions
that industry has wrongly stigmatized Spain, a number of
industry representatives present were clearly incensed with
his "urban legend" remark and the argument behind it. A
representative of a local Disney affiliate told Econoff
afterwards that his company take serious issue with Ros's
claim that there are no objective data showing Spain's piracy
problem to be worse than other countries'. Aldo Olcese cited
the attitude behind Ros's assertions as illustrative of the
difficulties the Coalition has encountered in trying to get
the government to act more vigorously against Internet
piracy. During his visit to Washington, Ros will meet with
the International Intellectual Proerty Alliance (IIPA) and
the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), among
others. These groups will no doubt challenge his denigration
of their data and his complacent assessment of Spain's
Internet piracy situation and legal regime. USTR will also
have the opportunity to help him understand why Spain is on
the Watch List and what it must do to get off it. The news
from both Olcese and Ros that an agreement and a government
initiative are close to fruition is certainly welcome, and
such an agreement, however modest, would be an important step
in the right direction.. End Comment.
CHACON

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 001152

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE AND EEB/TPP/IPE
STATE PASS USTR FOR D.WEINER AND J.GROVES
STATE PASS U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE FOR M.WOODS AND M.PALLANTE
COMMERCE FOR 4212/DON CALVERT
COMMERCE ALSO FOR USPTO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KIPR ETRD ECPS SP
SUBJECT: MADRID IPR CONFERENCE: GOS MOVES TOWARDS
ANTI-INTERNET PIRACY MEASURES

REF: A. MADRID 1137
¶B. MADRID 1096
¶C. MADRID 1075
¶D. MADRID 1052
¶E. MADRID 982

MADRID 00001152 001.3 OF 004


SUMMARY

¶1. (U) As part of FICOD 2009 (see ref A), on November 18 the
Spanish government hosted a Conference on IPR in the Digital
Environment. The Conference featured several speeches and a
series of roundtables on different aspects of online IPR
protection. Michele Woods of the U.S Copyright Office was a
panelist in a roundtable on policies and legislative
measures. MPAA CEO Dan Glickman delivered remarks outlining
the rights-holders' point of view. The Conference was
informative, with high-quality presentations The roundtable
discussions helped shed light on efforts underway in various
countries to address the problem of Internet piracy; the
Conference was thus particularly timely as the GOS is
expected to unveil a series of measures to combat
piracy-promoting websites by the end of the year.

¶2. (SBU) MPAA CEO Glickman told the Charge that his meetings
with the two Ministers most responsible for combating
Internet piracy were encouraging. Minister of Industry,
Tourism, and Trade (MITYC) Miguel Sebastian told Glickman
unambiguously that the Inter-Ministerial Commission's
recommendations will include an administrative course of
action to block or take down pirate websites. MITYC had
heretofore been believed to oppose such an approach, and
Sebastian's embrace of it may be a sign that the GOS is
preparing to implement measures with teeth, though not as
much as rights-holders would like to see. End Summary.

¶3. (U) MITYC's Secretariat of State for Telecommunications
and the Information Society (SETSI) organized the conference
as part of the third annual FICOD. It opened with an address
by Paul Brown, Vice-President of Spotify, a free, legal
online music service that has recently become available in
Spain and that was also featured recently in Economist
articles about successes in reducing online music piracy.
Spotify is supported by advertising revenue or, for those who
wish to avoid the ads, paid subscriptions. The increased
prevalence of legitimate vehicles for making content
available, and the need for much more legal content online as
a means of reducing the temptation to pirate, were major
recurring themes of the conference.

LEGISLATIVE ISSUES

¶4. (U) The roundtable on policies and legislative measures
included government officials from the U.S., the UK, Germany,
Sweden, and France, and a WIPO representative. Michele
Woods, Senior Counsel for Policy and International Affairs at
the U.S. Copyright Office, discussed the Google Books case,
its Revised Settlement Agreement, and implications for orphan
works. Steve Rowan of the UK Intellectual Property Office
(IPO), reported on recent developments in that country,
including new draft legislation adopting a "three strikes"
approach, which involves cutting Internet service to those
who repeatedly download illegally. Representatives of the
German and Swiss Justice Ministries addressed various
enforcement issues, including implementation of the EU
Enforcement Directive and prosecution of the Pirate Bay
principals. A French Culture Ministry official updated the
audience on the HADOPI law, which after many setbacks is to
take effect at the beginning of the year with the
promulgation of implementing regulations. It is evident that
in the United States and many European countries, there is a
great deal of activity taking place on a variety of fronts.

APPROACHES TO COMBATING ONLINE PIRACY

¶5. (U) The roundtable on The Fight Against IPR-Infringing
Activities on the Internet was moderated by Guillermo Corral,
Director General for Policy and Cultural Industries at the
Ministry of Culture, who spoke about GOS efforts to encourage
negotiations between the Coalition of Creators and Content
Industries and the Internet Service Providers' (ISP)
association (Redtel). He also alluded to the
Inter-Ministerial Commission formed October 9 (ref D) to make

MADRID 00001152 002.3 OF 004


recommendations to the government. The first panelist, Aldo
Olcese, spoke of changes that have taken place in his first
year as president of the Coalition, which previously
consisted of copyright management entities and various film
and music producers and distributors and audiovisual groups.
The Spanish Association of Video Game Publishers and
Distributors (aDeSe) joined the Coalition in January, and
Spain's major book publishing industry association joined
later in the year. Awareness on the part of the government
and the general public has grown, Olcese said, and the
content providers don't feel as isolated as they did before.
He characterized continuing efforts to finalize an agreement
between the Coalition and Redtel as "difficult" and predicted
that such an agreement will only be realized "at the last
minute."

¶6. (U) Olcese outlined what he called the "Spanish model" for
combating piracy, a model which he characterized as "more
democratic" than the approach in other countries, as it seeks
to reduce online availability of pirated material while
leaving the end user alone. The Spanish model is focused on
the producers and distributors of pirated content, the
pirates' "supermarket." Per ref D, on October 19 the
Coalition delivered a list of 200 alleged commercial-scale
pirate websites to the MITYC to be passed to the Prosecutor
General's Office (Fiscalia) for investigation and
prosecution, and also urged MITYC to take independent action
against the sites. (Comment: It remains unclear what
authority MITYC may have beyond the ability to levy modest
fines, nor are we aware whether the any GOS entity is
contemplating action against any of the listed websites. End
Comment.) At the same time, the Coalition has been actively
developing a "business model' approach and plans to launch a
"macro website" to help users in Spain gain access to legal
content online so that they will be less inclined to download
it without authorization. Both MITYC and the Ministry of
Culture have expressed the intention to provide financial
support to the macroweb. Olcese noted that identifying the
right mix of incentives and sanctions to deter Internet
piracy is still a matter of trial and error; nobody knows
which model will work best.

¶7. (U) Maria Teresa Arcos, Executive Director for ISP
association Redtel, hailed the creation of the
Inter-Ministerial Commission and said the ISPs seek the
continued growth of a legal online market and an end to the
dichotomy between technology and culture. She also cited the
European Parliament's recent approval of the telecom package"
and the importance of finding a balance between competing
rights. While acknowledging the importance of dissuasive
measures, Arcos focused on the need for attractive legal
offer with flexible prices and said Redtel looks forward to
the launching of the Coalition's macroweb.

¶8. (U) Jesus Rubi of the Spanish Data Protection Agency
(AEPD) stated that data protection is not inimical to
intellectual property protection. He noted, however, that
under Spanish law, Internet Protocol addresses and their
association with individual users are personal data and thus
protected from disclosure in most circumstances. Under the
European Court of Justice's January 2008 ruling in Promusicae
v. Telefonica, ISPs are not required to disclose users'
identities in civil litigation, and governments are not
obliged to compel them to do so. Governments are only
required to seek a balance between privacy and property
rights. Rubi noted that the Congressional Sub-committee on
Intellectual Property had recently sent a questionnaire to
AEPD, which had replied by suggesting several points to be
taken into account if Congress wishes to consider amending
existing legislation.

RIGHTS-HOLDERS' CONCERNS

¶9. (U) Juan Junquera, Chief of Staff to Secretary of State
for Telecommunications and the Information Society Francisco
Ros, moderated the panel on the rights-holders' point of
view. Olivia Regnier of the International Federation of
Phonographic Industries (IFPI) cited figures showing that 95
percent of peer-to-peer (P2P) downloads of music are
unauthorized and thus illegal. She also pointed to figures
showing a steady decline in traditional music sales in Spain
since 2001 and said called for more cooperation on the part

MADRID 00001152 003.3 OF 004


of ISPs in combating illicit downloads.

¶10. (U) Dan Glickman, Chairman and CEO of the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA), referred to President
Zapatero's October 21 speech to the American Business Council
(ref D) in which he outlined the concerns of both the USG and
the GOS over IPR protection in Spain. Calling piracy a
"dagger through the heart" of creators, Glickman noted that
great quality works of art require both a conduit and an
artist. The Internet can be a powerful tool for the
dissemination of culture but also poses unique challenges for
which there is no magic solution. Voluntary agreements with
ISPs are welcome but are not enough in themselves; government
has a necessary role to play. The digital environment will
continue to grow as a medium for cultural transmission, but
the physical environment should not be overlooked. The
notion of "free content," while seductive to some, is an
invitation to anarchy. Legal online offers of content will
not work unless they are well-implemented within an adequate
legal infrastructure. Glickman stressed the importance of a
constructive, balanced solution and said MPAA looks forward
to the GOS announcement of concrete measures by year's end.

¶11. (U) Antonio Guisasola of the Music Producers of Spain
(Promusicae), in an oblique reference to State Secretary
Ros's characterization (ref E) of Spain's Internet piracy
problem as an "urban legend," sought to dispel two urban
legends of his own. The first is that the music industry
wants to do away with the Internet; the second is that a lack
of legal online alternatives is the reason piracy flourishes
in Spain. There are, he said, 370 legal music services in
Europe, with more appearing all the time. Consumers are able
to choose from among a range of options and are increasingly
getting better deals. Guisasola announced the launch of
Promusicae's own portal, http://www.elportaldemusica.es, to link
Spanish users to prominent legal sites. But legal offer, he
said, is not enough. He cited a Jupiter Research Study
showing that 32% of users in Spain frequently use P2P
facilities, compared to an average of 15% for Europe. Of
those, 52% say that free downloading has reduced their
purchases of original music. Also, only 32% of Spaniards
surveyed said they thought P2P activity was illegal, compared
to 64% in France, 79% in Germany, and 70% in Europe as a
whole. Guisasola said more cooperation is needed from ISPs,
and there must be a credible risk of real punishment to deter
wrongdoers. Carrots can help, but sticks are needed as well.
Responding to Junquera's reminder that P2P is not illegal
per se, but is a technology that can be put to legal or
illegal uses, Guisasola countered that almost all P2P
downloads of music are illegal.

¶12. (U) During the question-and-answer period, one questioner
asked whether the Inter-Ministerial Commission will recommend
dissuasive action only against websites that house infringing
material, or also against P2P portals. Junquera replied that
the GOS is constrained from going after P2P activity by the
basic Constitutional principle protecting private
communications from government interference. IFPI's Olivia
Regnier demurred, pointing out that P2P activity is a form of
public, not private, communication. Junquera, however,
reiterated that the focus of GOS enforcement efforts will be
on websites that host or provide links to infringing content.
He also sought to clarify State Secretary Ros's "urban
legend" remark, which has been much-criticized by content
providers. The GOS, he said, does not deny that Internet
piracy is a serious problem in Spain, deserving of government
attention. The GOS does, however, take issue with assertions
that Spain has significantly higher rates of Internet piracy
than its European neighbors, and that it is among the worst
in the world in this regard.

¶13. (U) The Conference included one final roundtable, on
implications for IPR of online social networks, and a speech
by Duke University Law Professor James Boyle.

COMMENT

¶14. (SBU) Though 2009 has been a frustrating year for
right-holders, there is a good chance it will end on a
positive note. In a meeting with Charge, MPAA CEO Dan
Glickman expressed satisfaction with his meetings with
Industry, Tourism, and Trade Minister Miguel Sebastian and

MADRID 00001152 004.3 OF 004


Minister of Culture Angeles Gonzalez-Sinde. Sebastian, he
said, was quite forthright and specific about the
Commission's work: It will deliver its recommendations by
year's end; these will include amending the law to give
government more tools to combat piracy; and one component
will be "an administrative course of action" to block
offending websites. According to various sources, State
Secretary Ros (who reports to Sebastian and was present at
his meeting with Glickman) and his staffers had been opposing
such an administrative remedy in the Commission's discussions
(refs B-C), but have apparently been brought around by the
other Ministries represented. Rights-holders, however,
remain concerned that the government may implement only
half-measures. Promusicae staged a demonstration in front of
MITYC on December 1 and presented Minister Sebastian with a
peition signed by 2,500 music professionals calling on the
government to take "valiant measures, as the French and
British governments have already done, to protect their
culture and jobs." End Comment.
CHACON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 000133

SIPDIS

FOR P - U/S BURNS, ALSO FOR EUR - A/S GORDON

E.O. 12958 DECL: 02/04/2020
TAGS PREL, SP
SUBJECT: SPANISH REACTION TO ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING U.S.-EU
SUMMIT

MADRID 00000133 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador Alan D. Solomont, Reasons 1.4(b),(d).

¶1. (C) Summary. In the last 48 hours the Ambassador has spoken with Spanish National Security Advisor Leon, FM Moratinos, and President Zapatero regarding the announcement that President Obama will not attend a U.S.-EU Summit in Spain. Spanish disappointment -- both among senior government officials and in the media -- is profound. Nevertheless, the GOS is taking the high road, stressing the health of the U.S.-EU and U.S.-Spanish relationships. We are taking a similar approach privately and publicly, aggressively reaching out to media to urge that they not read into this decision some hidden and inaccurate message about U.S. policy. The Spanish still hope for a Presidential visit, and will probably raise that with Washington at every opportunity. End summary.

¶2. (C) It is important we all continue to reiterate a consistent message about what has and has not happened. There was never U.S. agreement to a summit. The GOS was told that on many occasions. The decision made this week has everything to do with the President’s very busy agenda and nothing to do with the importance the U.S. attaches to Europe and Spain. The U.S. has no more important relationship than the one its enjoys with Europe, and Spain is an important and valued ally. The President traveled to Europe six times last year. He met twice with President Zapatero in recent months, will see him again at the National Prayer Breakfast this week, and will receive King Juan Carlos at the White House February 17. The Spanish press is covering the story heavily. Our message is being repeated in the media, although commentary is running heavily towards characterizing the decision as a slight to Europe and Spain.

¶3. (C) The Spanish reaction is colored by the hopes they had pinned on this summit. The domestic economic news has been uniformly bad for Zapatero for a long time. That is not likely to change in the near future. Zapatero looked to the EU presidency as a chance to burnish Spain’s international standing, especially as a leader within the EU. The summit with the U.S. -- the first visit of a U.S. President in eight years -- was to be the climax of Spain’s presidency. Early on Spain proposed late May as the date and began working to convince U.S. officials of the value of a summit. Regrettably, and despite being told repeatedly that no dates were agreed, the GOS treated the summit as a fait accompli when talking to the media.

¶4. (C) The Spanish did take seriously U.S. injunctions that a summit needed concrete and worthwhile deliverables and began working on an agenda that would be meaningful to the U.S. In discussions with the Department of State and the NSC, the Spanish stressed some worthwhile topics such as data protection/information sharing, removing trade and regulatory barriers, climate change, and -- most recently as described to the Ambassador -- having Zapatero personally lead an effort to persuade other EU countries to accept more Guantanamo detainees. The Spanish did appear to have taken seriously their role as a transitional EU presidency, trying to find a balance with EU President Van Rompuy and High Representative Ashton, dividing up meetings, and agreeing on appropriate roles for both Van Rompuy and Zapatero in a proposed U.S.-EU Summit in Spain.

¶5. (C) By the time the new U.S. Ambassador arrived January 9, the GOS was clearly becoming nervous about the summit. In his first days, senior GOS officials raised the issue with the Ambassador, including Moratinos, Leon, Zapatero, and the King. In each instance, the Ambassador made clear that the USG had not yet agreed to a summit. His Spanish interlocutors made it equally clear that they placed great importance on having a summit.

¶6. (C) At this point, the Spanish do not feel betrayed, but they are deeply disappointed. Naturally they regret, as does everyone, that the bad news first appeared in the press. Despite that, the GOS is trying to put the best face on this situation. The Ambassador has explained personally to Leon, Moratinos and Zapatero that Spain remains an important and valued ally. In a February 2 conversation, Zapatero told the Ambassador he understands President Obama has a complicated agenda and that he traveled several times to Europe in the past year. Zapatero assured the Ambassador he understands the decision has nothing to do with U.S. feelings towards Spain or Europe. He said he hopes President Obama will find a convenient moment to visit Spain and suggested he would tell the President that when he sees him at the National Prayer Breakfast.
MADRID 00000133 002.2 OF 002

¶7. (C) Comment: Zapatero has taken a serious political blow at a time when he can ill afford it. Nevertheless, bilateral relations will survive intact. We expect Spain to follow through on its commitments to send more troops to Afghanistan, accept five Guantanamo detainees, and be helpful on Iran sanctions. The Spanish are still hopeful for a Presidential visit this year, perhaps in conjunction with the President’s visit to Lisbon in November. In that regard, we have advised the Spanish not to create false expectations. We do believe such a visit would be useful in terms of strengthening relations with an important ally who has demonstrated an increasing willingness to support U.S. priorities. The use of Spanish military bases by our Navy and Air Force has long been of great value to us as is Spain’s commitment in Afghanistan and its cooperation on CT, law enforcement, etc. Although Spanish leaders may voice their desire for a visit to senior USG officials, they should avoid making the same mistake twice of speaking publicly about a visit that has not been committed to. End comment. SOLOMONT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002215

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SP
SUBJECT: AZNAR KEPT UNDER WRAPS IN EU PARLIAMENT ELECTION
CAMPAIGN CENTERED ON IRAQ, US TIES


Classified By: Polcouns Kathleen Fitzpatrick, per 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

¶1. (C) Jose Maria Aznar did not participate in the Popular
Party's campaign for the June 13 EU parliamentary election.
With the Socialists making the war in Iraq and distancing
Spanish foreign policy from the US their central campaign
issues, Popular Party leaders decided that Aznar was too
radioactive to help in the campaign. Aznar insiders tell us
that Aznar recognized this as well, but is confident time
will ultimately vindicate his policies. Many in the PP
regarded Aznar's May visit to the US, which included a
private meeting with President Bush, as inopportune. They
believe the visit give the Socialists ammunition in their
efforts to portray the PP as a tool of the US. Following his
US visit, Aznar avoided the media and focused on presiding
over the PP think tank (FAES) and learning English in
preparation for speaking engagements. On June 13, the
Popular Party succeeded in beating expectations and came
within two points of the Socialists in the EU election. End
Summary.

Aznar Radioactive

¶2. (C) Aznar's longtime associate and former State Secretary
for Communication Alfredo Timmermans told us recently that
Aznar's decision to play no public role in the June 13 EU
parliament election campaign was his choice, but that it also
reflected the preference of PP leaders. The Socialists
(PSOE) sought a repeat of their March 14 surprise election
victory and played up themes that had worked for them,
notably opposition to the Iraq war and Aznar's close
relations with the US. Timmermans said that Aznar was
fully aware that he was politically radioactive and, as a
result, kept a low profile. His only public activities were
to appear at signings of new his book recounting his years in
office. (Timmermans noted sales are going well and the book
is now in its second printing.)

"Photo of the Azores"

¶3. (C) A Socialist refrain from the EU parliament election
campaign was the need to correct "the photo of the Azores."
To them, the March 2003 Azores summit stands for committing
Spain to an Iraq conflict that the Spanish public wanted no
part of and for allying with the US instead of France and
Germany.

¶4. (C) For this reason, there was unease in the PP when
Aznar visited the US in May 2004, only weeks after stepping
down from office. While PP leaders stated that Aznar had a
right to travel where he wished, many, including Aznar
loyalists, felt that given the EU election Aznar should have
postponed the trip until after June 13. Timmermans told us
that many in the PP wanted Aznar to "stay home and say
nothing." Timmermans said Aznar understood that he is, for
the present, a divisive figure but that he is confident time
will vindicate his policies toward Iraq and the US.
Timmermans said Aznar was buoyed by the warm reception he
received in the US and, in particular, by his meeting with
President Bush. Timmermans contrasted this warmth with the
reticence Aznar has encountered from some in the Popular
Party since March 14.

Aznar's Messages to the US

¶5. (C) Timmermans noted that Aznar had expressed concern to
President Bush that the March 11 Madrid terrorist attacks had
sent a message to terrorists that they can influence
elections. Aznar urged vigilance in advance of US
elections. Aznar believes al Qaeda inspired terrorists
might also target countries like Italy where public opinion
is vulnerable. Timmermans said Aznar believes the US has
to brace for continued bad news from Iraq and came away with
the impression that some US observers may be too optimistic
about the medium term outlook. Timmermans said an election
defeat by President Bush in November would be read, rightly
or wrongly, in Spain as a defeat for the Popular Party and
would give the Socialists a boost.

¶6. (C) Timmermans said the PP, Aznar included, continues to
be "astonished" by the chain of events from the March 11
terrorist attacks to surprise election defeat on March 14.
Many Popular Party members, Timmermans said, blame Aznar's
Iraq policy for the defeat and believe Aznar gambled with the
party's future on Iraq and lost. Like other Spaniards (80
percent according to some polls), most PP members were not
sorry to see the Spanish troops come home, Timmermans said.

¶7. (C) Timmermans underlined that Aznar remains unyielding
in his beliefs. Aznar will continue to support the Iraq war
and say publicly that the Madrid terrorist attacks on March
11 brought the Socialists to power. Timmermans (speaking
before June 13) noted that President Zapatero is still in the
honeymoon phase and thus the PSOE would have an important
electoral advantage. Zapatero has not had to make any
unpopular decisions and his one major decision ) to pull the
troops out ) was highly popular. Timmermans said that all
of Zapatero's decisions are taken with one idea in mind:
doing what is popular.

Aznar's Future

¶8. (C) Aznar is confident that in the longer term, he will
be vindicated, Timmermans said. However, the current period
is a difficult one for the PP and for Aznar personally. In
the coming year, Aznar intends to travel frequently to the
US. While based in Spain, he will make speeches to US
audiences and teach occasional seminars at Georgetown.
Aznar is working hard on his English and is presiding over
the Popular Party think tank, FAES. Timmermans said Aznar
will make it a point to speak out in favor of the
transatlantic link and the need for close relations with the
United States.

June 13: PP Exceeds Expectations, On Road to Recovery

¶9. (C) Popular Party strategists told us in the run up to
the June 13 election that the PP goal was to keep the race
close. None said that they expected to win, but they did
hope to cut the Socialist margin. Polling had given the
Socialists a 6 to 9 point advantage. The June 13 result was
far tighter: the Socialists won by only two points. PP
leaders regard this as a relative victory. Jorge Moragas,
PP Director for International Affairs, told us that the
result at least succeeded in giving a "shock" to the
over-confidence of the Socialists and is a signal the PP is
on the road to recovery.
MANZANARES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 000934

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/WE CLEMENTS AND HALL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN'S OPPOSITION POPULAR PARTY: LOSING THE
BATTLE WITH THE GOVERNMENT

REF: A. MADRID 765
¶B. MADRID 783

Classified By: Ambassador Eduardo Aguirre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (U) Summary. Two years after it lost in the dramatic
elections of March 14, 2004 -- three days after the March 11
terrorist attacks -- Spain's main opposition party, the
Partido Popular (PP) finds itself outmaneuvered and either
isolated with radical nationalists or forced to collaborate
with the Socialist government of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero
on the most important issues of Spanish domestic politics.
Even when the governing PSOE (Socialist) party was losing
ground in opinion polls, the statistics did not reflect any
increase in popularity for the PP, only a fall in the
government approval rating because of uncertainty about
regional questions in Catalonia and the Basque Country. The
recent ceasefire announcement by the Basque terrorist group
ETA has raised the government's poll ratings significantly,
and marks a monumental inflection point for the PP in its
search for the critical swing votes at the center of the
political spectrum. A combination of leadership and message
problems has kept the PP from capturing the imagination of
the Spanish electorate, along with a consistent
underestimation of the political skill of the Zapatero
government. It may take an internal revolution in the party
or a significant recalibration of strategy for the PP to come
back in the immediate future. End summary.

----------------
No to Everything
----------------

¶2. (C) Since losing the March 2004 elections, the Partido
Popular, led by Mariano Rajoy and his team of veterans from
the government of Jose Maria Aznar, has struggled to make
headway against the ruling Socialist Party (PSOE) and the
government of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. Blaming the PP
loss on the March 11 train bombings and the evil machinations
of the Socialists, Embassy PP contacts have consistently
seemed to think that their election loss was really a
mistake, a massive "misunderstanding" on the part of the
electorate, ignoring the very real issues voters disagreed
with them on: the war in Iraq -- which 90% of Spaniards
opposed -- and, importantly, the Aznar government's handling
of the March 11 attacks. The party has spent the last two
years trying to win support by harassing the Zapatero
government on everything it does (including when it is
cooperating with the USG).

¶3. (C) PP contacts have told us that their party strategy has
been to attack the government at every turn. These attacks
made ideological sense when the PP criticized the government
on issues such as gay marriage, education reform (reducing
the influence of the Catholic Church) or even in opposing GOS
policy on Cuba and Venezuela. However, the PP also chose to
take the government to task over Spanish military presence in
Afghanistan and the participation of the Spanish frigate
Alvaro Basan in the US Theodore Roosevelt battle group in the
Persian Gulf, policies of this government which support US
goals. The PP's attacks on these policies were therefore
inconsistent with their own stated aims.

--------
The Hook
--------

¶4. (U) According to numerous public opinion polls, the PP
made little or no dent (beyond its own base) in the
government's popularity with its attack strategy, until a
truly divisive issue came about: the reform of the Catalan
Autonomy Statute ("Estatut" in the Catalan language). As the
Catalans tried to declare in the legal document defining
their relations with Madrid that they constitute a "nation,"
many Spaniards wanted to know why the government seemed to be
letting them pull out of the Spanish nation they supposedly
already belonged to. In addition, the new Estatut was to give
Catalonia broad fiscal independence, beyond what any other
region of Spain had ever been granted. While the issue of the
Estatut did not worry all Spaniards, enough were concerned
that government approval ratings began to fall. This was
exacerbated last autumn by floods of Sub-Saharan would-be
immigrants charging Spanish borders at Ceuta and Melilla, as
well as by speculation that the Socialist government was
holding talks with Basque terrorist group ETA.

¶5. (U) The Estatut, immigration and terrorism concerns gave
the PP the hook it needed to be able to craft a message that
might help it benefit from the government's falling
popularity. Rajoy, Catalan PP leader Josep Pique, and

MADRID 00000934 002 OF 004


national leaders such as PP Secretary General Angel Acebes
and Parliamentary Spokesman Eduardo Zaplana began speaking of
national unity, equality for all Spaniards (in other words,
no special privileges for Catalans and Basques), and joining
together to put forth a strong face internationally
(harkening back to the Aznar days, when the PP says Spain had
more prestige both within the European Union as well as on
the wider international stage). Nonetheless, while government
popularity continued to fall, the PP did not pick up any
support for itself with this message. And now, the ETA
ceasefire has diminished public concerns about negotiating
with the Basque group, and raised Zapatero's poll numbers
substantially, by as much as eight percentage points in one
poll.

¶6. (C) Interestingly, PP leaders do not seem persuaded of the
need to change the message, influence the poll numbers or
attract more swing voters. Zaplana told the Ambassador on
March 29 that the PP base would likely carry the party in any
future elections (once again reflecting the PP belief that
the 2004 loss was a one-off fluke), and that it was important
to take care of that base. In a meeting with the Ambassador,
Acebes explained that the PP's platform was one of Spanish
unity, stable public administration, and a solid economic
plan. The PP claims repeatedly that this platform is one of
principle, whose correctness will be recognized in time by
the electorate. Meanwhile, it continues to paint a picture of
gloom and doom for the country under the Zapatero, with Aznar
claiming that the "Balkanization of Spain" is near, with an
independent Catalonia and Basque Country. It is true that the
message and apocalyptic image rally the PP base Zaplana spoke
of, a base that is somewhat larger than PSOE's, and most
non-PP Spaniards certainly do not want to see the break up of
Spain. Nevertheless, the Socialists' poll numbers rise.

----------
Leadership
----------

¶7. (C) A key reason the PP was not able to capitalize on the
PSOE poll decline is its top leadership, with personalities
ranging from lackluster to radioactive. The principal leaders
of the PP were all close to former President Jose Maria
Aznar, and are closely associated with the Aznar era. During
the 2004 elections, before the March 11 attacks, association
with Aznar was a positive, given the President's popularity.
His former Vice President Mariano Rajoy was expected to sweep
to victory as leader of the party. But since the attacks, the
team has been tainted by the Aznar government's handling of
the aftermath of the March 11 bombings, when it claimed that
Basque terrorist group ETA was responsible and appeared to
keep information on Islamist involvement from the public.

¶10. (C) Rajoy is generally considered a competent and
intelligent leader, but not especially charismatic. Acebes,
who was Interior Minister in March 2004, is viewed in a
particularly negative light because of his direct involvement
in the handling of the attacks. Zaplana is also closely
identified with the Aznar legacy, and is often criticized for
his very conservative stance on most issues (he recently
commented in a congressional debate on Vice President Maria
Teresa Fernandez de la Vega's wardrobe choices, to feminist
indignation). (See reftel A for more on Acebes and Zaplana.)

¶9. (C) And then there is the ever-present former president,
Jose Maria Aznar, who carries only a ceremonial title in the
Partido Popular, but who casts his large shadow over
everything the party does (see reftel B). After an extremely
successful eight years in office, during which the Spanish
economy flourished and Spain's standing in the world
increased substantially, Aznar stepped down as party leader
and appointed Mariano Rajoy his successor. Because of his
success, he is still enormously admired within the party.
When Aznar enters a room full of PP activists, a hush falls
over the crowd. When Aznar walked into a book presentation
for PP Parliamentarian (and self-proclaimed "shadow Foreign
Minister") Gustavo de Aristegui's latest book, "Jihad in
Spain," Aristegui gave a spontaneous speech on how Aznar had
been his inspiration. In his first meeting with Ambassador
Aguirre on December 15, 2005, Aznar claimed that he and his
think tank FAES were careful not to interfere in national
political battles; yet, in reality, at every opportunity,
Aznar leverages his past influence (including his access to
high-level USG officials) to affect current political
discourse. And because of his cult status within the party
ranks, the current leadership of the party has difficulty
setting the course.

-------------------------
Underestimating the Enemy

MADRID 00000934 003 OF 004


-------------------------

¶10. (C) All of the leaders of the PP machine -- Rajoy,
Acebes, and Zaplana -- as well as former President Aznar
speak of President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero with scorn
and condescension. Zaplana told the Ambassador that Zapatero
is full of himself and has too much confidence in his ability
to maneuver politically, particularly in an election
campaign. Aznar called him "weak and vacillating" (reftel B).

¶11. (C) In reality, while the question of whether Zapatero's
policies are intelligent or correct is certainly open for
discussion, it is clear that the government has outmaneuvered
the opposition on the two most controversial issues of this
parliamentary session: the Catalan Statute and the future of
ETA. Zapatero united at the last moment with the centrist
Catalan nationalist party Convergencia i Unio, working all
night with party leader Artur Mas to hammer out an accord
agreeable to both sides and passable in Parliament. The PP
opposed the agreement, leaving it isolated in Parliament with
the ultra-nationalist Catalan party ERC, the only two parties
to vote against the text.

¶12. (C) After the PP spent months accusing the government of
"negotiating with terrorists" by talking to ETA, the group
announced a ceasefire, using some of the least demanding
language ever seen in its communiques. Polls indicate that
swing voters are turning toward the government, and around
64% of Spaniards say the government should look into the
possibility of peace negotiations and the PP should join in
that effort. The PP has found itself obligated to cooperate
with Zapatero in pursuit of peace, with little hope of
political gain. If the ceasefire turns out to be permanent,
the Zapatero government will get the credit for peace. Yet if
ETA begins demanding too much in negotiations and the PP
turns against the process, it could be blamed for the
failure. This supposedly weak president has managed
completely to isolate the more politically experienced
opposition on both issues. And if, as post suspects, Zapatero
manages to keep negotiations with ETA going until after the
general elections expected in early 2008 (or if he succeeds
outright in bringing peace through negotiation), he will be
difficult to defeat, given the continued strength of the
economy and the prospect of the end of ETA after almost 50
years of existence.

-----------
Revolution?
-----------

¶13. (C) Given the rigid structure of political parties in
Spain, barring internal party revolution, it is nearly
impossible for politicians to come to leadership in a party
without working their way through the ranks and spending
years paying homage to their elders. An internal PP
revolution is not impossible, however: if the party continues
to underestimate the governing party and fails to put forth a
strategy to win votes, future election losses -- perhaps in
2008 -- will force radical change in the leadership. In such
a case, certainly Acebes and Zaplana would have to depart
center stage, and probably most of the former ministers from
the Aznar government.

¶14. (C) There are several PP personalities who would be
well-positioned in the event of such a revolution. They are
slightly more centrist on social issues, solidly conservative
on economic issues, with wide cross-over appeal to PSOE
voters. All have extensive and successful experience in
public administration.

--Alberto Ruiz-Gallardon: Consistently one of the most
popular politicians in Spain, according to opinion polls, the
mayor of Madrid has nonetheless not been in the inner circle
within his own party, and is despised by the far right wing
of the PP. He has challenged party orthodoxy on several
occasions, supporting non-consensus candidates for leadership
positions and criticizing his party's time in government.
After Madrid lost its bid to host the Olympic Games in 2012,
when several PP politicians outrageously blamed the loss on
the PSOE government's deteriorated relationship with the
United States, Gallardon -- who had spearheaded the bid --
commented, "If anyone is to blame, it is me. Don't let anyone
place the responsibility anywhere else; I assume it all." In
his speech at the PP national convention in March 2006, he
proposed that his party look at the possibility of
"neutralizing the radical discourse... that is taking over,
and to reinvent it using a moderating message to reassure the
citizens... We need to fight for the things we need to fight
for, but we cannot let dogmatic attitudes carry us away to
dogmatism. Our place is with the people, with their real

MADRID 00000934 004 OF 004


concerns..." With statements such as these, Gallardon comes
across to swing voters (and to many Socialists) as
principled, rather than partisan. After eight years as
President of the Madrid Region and now three years as mayor,
he has extensive political and administrative experience. His
controversial urban renewal plan for Madrid, which has caused
great upheaval on the highways and in the subways of the
city, is still a wildcard, as many Madrilenos (and Embassy
employees) spend hours in traffic jams around construction
sites all over the city. If the work comes out well, however,
the renewal of Madrid could be a strong positive for
Gallardon's political ambitions.

--Francisco Camps: Camps, anointed by Eduardo Zaplana,
followed in his footsteps to become President of the
Generalitat Valenciana (Valencia Region) and regional PP
president. Since he was elected in 2003, he has fallen out
with his former mentor and worked hard to forge his own
political identity, both within the Generalitat and
nationally. After he worked across parties to agree on a the
reform of the Valencia Regional Statute in 2005, he has
become the PP poster child for bipartisan cooperation, the
party's proof on the national stage that it really can work
with the opposition party. Though still relatively young, his
national stature has grown substantially, and he seems a good
candidate to move into the PP national leadership in the
event of a major shake-up.

--Esperanza Aguirre: President of the Madrid Region as well
as regional PP president, Aguirre has been very close to the
current PP inner circle (and a sworn enemy of Gallardon),
serving as Aznar's Education Minister during his first term,
and President of the Senate during his second. Nonetheless,
she retains a wider base and, because of her regional
experience, a certain distance that would likely allow her to
take on a leadership role in the party in a time of change,
despite her ties to the old guard. She describes herself as a
"neoliberal," but has advocated a certain pragmatism on
social issues when dealing with the Zapatero government, for
example describing the PP leadership's insistence in taking
the new gay marriage law to the constitutional court as
"politically inopportune." Because of her extensive political
experience and national stature, she could be good transition
leader in a redirected Partido Popular.

¶15. (C) All three of these politicians are expected to re-win
their positions in regional and municipal elections coming up
in 2007, consolidating Madrid and Valencia as PP strongholds.
The current PP leadership hopes these elections will give the
party the push it needs nationally to win national elections
in 2008. In the two years left before the elections, there
may yet be surprises that would give the PP a real advantage:
if ETA negotiations break down, or if the strong Spanish
economy falters, the PP could find its chance to take votes
away from Zapatero. With peace on the horizon and a strong
enconomy, however, on their current trajectory Zapatero and
PSOE look well-placed to win again, perhaps even with an
increased majority. At that point, the PP would have to start
looking at these regional leaders to take it in a new
direction nationally.
AGUIRRE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002632

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH FORMER PRESIDENT AZNAR

REF: BARCELONA 148

MADRID 00002632 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Amb. Eduardo A. Aguirre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador hosted former President Jose
Maria Aznar for a private lunch at his residence on October
¶16. President Aznar offered his opinions on the domestic
political situation as well as the outlook in Latin America.
He also told Ambassador of his satisfaction at seeing
improved United States-Spain relations, despite the
difficulties this presents to his party in opposition. He
told the Ambassador that he fears the current government is
presiding over the "Balkanization" of Spain. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) During their October 16 luncheon, former President
Aznar told the Ambassador that he views with satisfaction the
improving GOS relationship with the U.S. over the past year.
Aznar said that, as a Spaniard, he accepts this as a positive
development although it presents difficulties for his
opposition Partido Popular (PP). (COMMENT: Maintaining the
trans-Atlantic relationship has long been one of the PP's key
platforms, and PP leaders have hammered Zapatero for
upsetting ties with Washington. The PP has also criticized
the Zapatero government for steps it has taken that are
important to the U.S., such as the Spanish deployment to
Afghanistan and Lebanon. While efforts to improve the
bilateral relationship have eased the sting of this PP
criticism, PP leaders apparently have viewed U.S.-Spain
tensions as favorable to their interests. Aznar's comments
may reflect a new approach on this subject. We have told
both the PP and the Socialist Party now in power to avoid
using the U.S. in their political football, as this benefits
neither Spanish nor U.S. interests. END COMMENT.)

//Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Mexico//

¶3. (C) Aznar told the Ambassador about his recent speaking
tour in Latin America. He found that Argentina is
increasingly turning inward and that internal politics will
be the dominant force in Argentina for several years. In
Chile, he told the Ambassador that President Bachelet is
strongly influenced by her father's murder and her own
torture during the Pinochet regime. Aznar said that these
experiences are more profoundly shaping her executive
decisions than he had previously believed. On Peru, Aznar
expressed his belief that Alan Garcia is a "new man" who has
cast aside the legacy of his previous administration and who
is deeply committed to creating stability and economic
opportunity. He also said that President Uribe appears very
secure and established in Colombia. Aznar saw deep internal
divisions in Mexico, but he noted that the U.S. border fence
project is a unifying force of anti-American sentiment, to
the detriment of U.S. relations with Mexico.

//ETA, Basque Country and Catalonia//

¶4. (C) Aznar said he fears that the GOS is presiding over
the "Balkanization" of Spain, by allowing the autonomous
communities greater independence. The PP feels that by
allowing the 2006 Catalonia referendum on autonomy, the GOS
has opened the floodgates to demands for greater local
control. Worse, by entering into negotiations with ETA, the
GOS has nearly legitimized the Basque self-determination
movement. Aznar expressed his belief that the ongoing ETA
negotiations will fail. He said that the only way to deal
with ETA is as a criminal organization. The negotiations
never had a chance for success, he said, because neither side
ever had any room to maneuver or flexibility in their
positions. According to Aznar, ETA will never abandon its
demand for Basque self-determination, and the GOS can never
agree to that demand.

¶5. (C) Adhering to the party line, Aznar expressed
confidence that the PP would win a slim plurality in the
approaching Catalonia regional election. NOTE: Polling
indicates that the Catalan "middle of the road" CiU party is
likely to win the regional election, though it may have to
form a tripartite coalition to govern (reftel). The PP is
not even assured a place in that coalition, as it currently
is polling at around 10 percent in the region. END NOTE.

------------------------------------------
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------------------------------------------

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AGUIRRE